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This paper makes use of long-run restrictions to identify macroeconomic shocks and evaluate 
their relative importance for exchange rate fluctuations. Unlike previous studies that employ a 
similar approach, I consider a large eight variable vector autoregressive system that includes short 
term interest rates rather than money stocks in order to help identify monetary policy shocks. 
Results for the U.S. and the U.K. show that monetary policy shocks and other macroeconomic 
shocks behave according to theory. However, monetary shocks account for only a small fraction 
of the variance of the real exchange rate. Instead, “taste shocks” that can be associated with the 
degree of trade openness, terms of trade, and current account appear to be the key factor driving 
the U.S.-U.K. real exchange rate. Results for other countries under consideration (Canada, 
Germany, and Japan) are similar. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F31 
 
Key Words:  vector autoregression; taste shocks; monetary shocks; exchange rate 
movements; long-run identifying restrictions. 
 
                                                 
* I would like to thank my advisor James Morley for his guidance and advice that has led to the formation 
of this work, and to Gaetano Antinolfi, Ryan Compton, Yunjong Eo, Steve Fazzari, Jeremy Jackson, John 
Rogers, and Tara Sinclair for their helpful comments and continued support. Funding for this research was 
provided in part by the Center for Research in Economics and Strategy (CRES) in the Olin School of 




The volatile nature of exchange rate movements since the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates has led economists to consider three important questions: What 
are the sources of exchange rate fluctuations? Are monetary policy shocks the main factor? Do 
other macroeconomic shocks matter more?  In this paper, I present an eight-variable vector 
autoregression (VAR) model using long-run identification restrictions to address the long-
standing issue of whether nominal/monetary shocks matter for exchange rates. In contrast to 
other empirical papers using a similar identification strategy, my larger VAR system allows for 
the inclusion of many relevant domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables. In addition, I use 
short-term interest rates, as advocated by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), rather than the usual 
money stocks to help identify monetary policy shocks. Results in this paper show that nominal 
shocks are not important for the bilateral exchange rates between the U.S. and four other G7 
countries (U.K., Canada, Germany, and Japan). Other macroeconomic shocks identified in the 
VAR, such as supply or commodity price shocks, also have little influence on the real exchange 
rate. Instead, exchange rate fluctuations appear to arise from “taste” shocks that can be related to 
the international trade sector of the economies under investigation.  
 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 gives a brief literature 
survey. Section 3 details the VAR model under consideration, the data, and the shock 
identification strategy. Section 4 shows the results of the VAR estimation. Section 5 investigates 
the properties and the sources of the taste shock. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature  Review   
 
The nature of the shocks that lead to exchange rate fluctuations has been a source of 
contention for economists for a long time. In an influential paper, Mussa (1986) argues that 
sluggish price adjustment must be the key factor in explaining the short-run movements in real 
and nominal exchange rates. This of course implies that the interaction of sticky prices and  
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monetary shocks could have been the source of volatile exchange rates in the post-Bretton 
Woods era. On the other hand, Stockman (1987) disputes the idea that monetary shocks are to 
blame for the behavior of real exchange rates after the collapse of Bretton Woods. He argues that 
real shocks with large permanent components are the main culprits. With competing theories 
explaining exchange rate fluctuations, the debate must be brought to the data. Indeed, there exists 
a large body of empirical work in the area. However, even empirical studies on exchange rates 
have failed to reach consensus on whether monetary shocks matter for exchange rate variability. 
Some papers suggest little or no role for monetary shocks while other papers have found that 
monetary shocks are the most important in driving exchange rate movements. For example, 
Grilli and Roubini (1995) report the share of the dollar-pound exchange rate variance accounted 
for by monetary shocks to be as low as 2 percent while Rogers (1999) reports a share as high as 
41 percent. This large discrepancy primarily reflects the major difficulty in empirical work on 
exchange rates: how to correctly identify monetary policy shocks and judge their relative 
importance.  
 
The most common approach to identification of economic shocks involves the imposition 
of short-run restrictions within a VAR model. In particular, some of the contemporaneous effects 
of shocks on the variables in the VAR are restricted to zero. These restrictions can be either 
recursive or non-recursive, though under both categories the assumptions made can be rather 
implausible. For example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) assume that foreign interest rates do 
not respond to Federal Reserve policy shocks until a month after policy is changed, which is 
inconsistent with large movements in foreign rates immediately after the Federal Open Market 
Committee’s (FOMC) policy announcements. In works that employ this kind of identification 
procedure, the estimated range of the share of monetary shocks in the total variance in real or 
nominal exchange rate is quite large, from around 2 percent (Grilli and Roubini 1995, U.S.-U.K. 
nominal exchange rate on impact) to 34 percent (Kim and Roubini 2000, U.S.-U.K. 7 variable 
model, six-month horizon for nominal exchange rate).  
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Identification of VAR models can also be achieved with long-run restrictions, as 
originally advocated by Blanchard and Quah (1989). With this method, some shocks (most likely 
nominal/monetary shocks) are assumed to have no long-run effect on real economic activity. 
These restrictions often make intuitive economic sense. They also allow for easy structural 
interpretation of all of the shocks in the VAR system. Most other popular techniques of 
identification, such as recursive and non-recursive short-run restrictions or sign/shape 
restrictions,
1 typically only allow for “partial identification” of the shock of interest without 
giving an interpretation to all the other shocks in the system. Clarida and Gali (1994) provide the 
seminal investigation of the effects of real and nominal shocks on real exchange rate by using 
long-run identification restrictions. I implement the same identification approach in this paper. 
However, unlike Clarida and Gali (1994) or other previous papers that employ a similar 
identification strategy, I estimate a much larger VAR system that includes many potentially 
relevant variables. (Clarida and Gali’s model has only three variables, while I include eight 
variables.) In addition, I use short-term interest rates rather than the usual money stocks to 
identify monetary policy shocks. 
 
Similar to studies using short-run identification restriction, results on the importance of 
monetary policy shocks for real exchange rates using long-run restrictions are often at odds with 
each other. Clarida and Gali (1994) suggest monetary shocks are unimportant (their highest 
estimated share of variance due to monetary shocks is 2.2 percent for U.S.-U.K. real exchange 
rate), while Rogers (1999) finds that the contribution of monetary shocks can be as high as 40.6 
percent for U.S.-U.K. real exchange rate. My results correspond well with the findings in Clarida 
 
1 Sign and shape restrictions are fairly recent developments in the area of VAR identification. In Canova and De 
Nicoló (2002), Faust (1998), and Uhlig (2005), the general idea is to systematically examine a variety of 
identification schemes, and then, through elimination by penalty functions or sign/shape restrictions on the impulse-
response functions, find a unique solution. This approach is well suited to assessing the robustness of certain claims 
from identified VAR work. However, the formal restrictions imposed to arrive at the final choice, such as sign 
restrictions, are still subjective and some would argue even more restrictive than the short-run or long-run restriction 
approaches. Also, Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005) only “partially” identify the structural model. Hence, besides the 
shock of interest, one cannot examine what other shock in the system may have important effect on the real 
exchange rate. Farrant and Peersman (2006) modified the Uhlig (2005) method to allow the full set of shocks to be 
identified by imposing a larger collection of sign restrictions. However, this is only feasible in relatively small VAR 
systems (the largest system in Farrant and Peersman 2006 has just four variables) as it becomes increasingly difficult 
to impose credible sign restrictions when the number of variables in the model gets larger.  
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and Gali (1994) in spite of the differences in the included variables in our models. In particular, I 
find that monetary policy shocks only account for about 2 percent of the total variance of the 
dollar-pound real exchange rate on impact. Contrast that to the “taste” shock, which accounts for 
close to 70 percent of the total variance of the dollar-pound real exchange rate on impact.  
 
Unlike other studies in the area, this paper goes a step further to investigate the potential 
sources for the taste shock. Based on the VAR analysis, this taste shock does not appear to be 
associated with traditional demand-type disturbances that would have only a short-lived impact 
on output and interest rates. Instead, using regression analysis, I find that changes in relative 
trade openness, relative terms of trade, and relative current account between the country pairs 
could be important factors driving the taste shock. The result that real shocks originating from 
the demand side (in particular the international trade sector of the economy) are the main sources 
of exchange rate fluctuations distinguishes this paper from previous studies that have shown 
monetary disturbances to be unimportant. Most would argue that if real shocks matter for 
exchange rates, it should be coming in from the supply side through productivity type 
disturbances that impact exchange rates via the Balassa-Samuelson effect. So the results here 
provide empirical evidence for economists who have argued that demand side macroeconomic 
fundamentals can be an important determinant of the exchange rate.
2 
 




Four country pairs are considered in this paper: U.S.-U.K., U.S.-Canada, U.S.-Germany, 
and U.S.-Japan. The U.S.-U.K. VAR model will be the benchmark for easy comparison with 
 
2 There is some theoretical support for the linkage between exchange rates and the international trade sector. Choi 
(2005) develops a theoretical macroeconomic model that justifies a trade based representation of the real exchange 
rate (real exchange rate as a function of international trade flows, among other things). She shows that this trade 
based representation is highly correlated with actual real exchange rates for a wide range of countries, leading her to 
conclude that real exchange rates are closely connected to international trade flows and macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  
5
                                                
other papers in the literature. The national currencies of these countries are among the most 
heavily traded in the world. This may in part reflect their status as major trading partners with the 
U.S.
3 These countries are also selected to facilitate comparisons with Clarida and Gali (1994) 
and Rogers (1999) and to represent distinctly different trading areas (Non-continental Europe, 
North America, Continental Europe, and East Asia). The sample period is 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 for 
all countries except Canada (1970Q2 to 2006Q2) and Germany (1970Q2 to 2005Q4).  
 
Eight variables, including output, exchange rate, prices, and interest rates, are used in the 
estimation of each U.S.-foreign country VAR. All the variables are in natural logs (except for the 
interest rate variables) and demeaned. Please refer to Table 1 for details of the variables and their 
corresponding data sources. Estimation of the VAR model requires that each of the variables 
entering the VAR is stationary. Series that are non-stationary should be transformed 
appropriately prior to estimation, otherwise finite-sample inferences may suffer serious 
distortions. Because the standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and the KPSS test 
developed by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) show that in general all variables 
except for interest rates are integrated of order one in levels, they enter into the VAR in first 
differences.  
 
An important assumption in my model is that there are permanent shocks to the real 
exchange rate. This is only possible if the real exchange rate series are non-stationary in levels. It 
is common knowledge that testing for the presence of unit roots in exchange rates is extremely 
difficult. Research in this area has presented evidence on both sides of the argument. Rogoff 
(1996) provides an excellent summary of the debate. The general consensus is that in the short-
run, real exchange rate fluctuations are too persistent to be justifiably monetary in nature. Hence 
the fluctuations can be treated as effectively permanent, implying the presence of unit root in real 
exchange rates. But over the very long-run (over one hundred years of data) one can find more 
 
3 In terms of total trade, according to the most recent trade data (May 2009) from the Census Bureau, Canada is the 
U.S.’s number 1 trading partner, Japan is number 4, Germany is number 5, and the U.K. is number 6. These 
rankings have not changed much for the last twenty years or so. All countries considered here have been top ten 
trading partners of the U.S. over the past decades, though the rankings for Japan and the U.K. have dropped back 
somewhat in recent years due to the increase in U.S. trade with China and Mexico.  
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evidence that the exchange rate conforms to some version of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
condition (see Edison 1987). Since the purpose of this paper is not to determine if PPP holds 
over very long-run periods, but to determine what factors are important over the relatively 
shorter horizons (i.e. 20 to 30 years), I will proceed as if real exchange rates are non-stationary.  
 
It has long been argued that there are structural breaks in the mean of the level of U.S. 
inflation during the sample period considered in this paper. Ignoring such breaks could yield 
spuriously high degree of persistence in the inflation series that might affect the VAR estimates. 
A wide range of potential break dates have been suggested for the U.S. inflation rate. Levin and 
Piger (2003) found a break in mean in 1991Q1 or 1991Q2 using four different measures of 
inflation, while Rapach and Wohar (2005) located three break dates (1967Q3, 1973Q1, and 
1982Q1). Instead of adopting break dates reported in earlier studies, I test for structural break 
dates using a procedure based on Bai and Perron (1998). The results are presented in Table 2 
along with some details of the procedure.
4 I have uncovered only one break for the U.S. inflation 
rate over my sample period. The break date 1981Q2 is in agreement with findings in the 
literature that inflation persistence was exceptionally high during the period from 1965 to the 
early 1980s, though whether persistence continued to be high since then, or has declined, is more 
hotly contested. Since a break in U.S. inflation could induce a break in the relative inflation 
variables as well, the same break date found for U.S. inflation is allowed for each of the relative 
inflation variables. Then a search for additional breaks is carried out. All of the relative inflation 
measures appear to have multiple structural breaks. Rapach and Wohar (2005) have also found 
multiple breaks in thirteen industrialized countries’ inflation rates.  
 
The structural break for U.S. inflation implies that the short-term interest rate variables in 
the VAR could also have structural breaks. Caporale and Grier (2000) and Bai and Perron (2003) 
have both found that multiple structural breaks exist in U.S. real interest rates. To locate potential 
structural breaks in the interest rate variables, I start by imposing the break date found for U.S. 
 
4 Since GDP deflator is used as the price data for Germany, I have to construct relative prices with U.S. GDP 
deflator as well. Due to this complication, the structural breaks for the Δp and Δ(p – p*) variables in the U.S.-
German case differs somewhat from the other country pairs. 
 inflation rate (Δp) on the 3-month treasury bill rate (itbr) and then implement the same procedure 
as used for inflation rates to search for additional breaks in the interest rate variables. As shown 
in Table 2, four break dates are found for itbr.
5 To be consistent, I impose these same break dates 
on the relative short-term rates (i – i
*) and search for further breaks. The relative interest rates 
tend to have more breaks than the U.S. domestic rates. This is possibly related to the findings in 
Rapach and Wohar (2005) of multiple structural breaks in real interest rates using international 
data.  
   
3.2  Structural VAR Framework 
 
  For the benchmark model, the vector of variables of interest x ≡ [Δ(y – y*), Δy, Δq, Δp
c, 
Δ(p – p*), Δp, i – i*, itbr]’ is assumed to follow a multivariate covariance stationary process. The 
typical VAR representation assumes that the vector x depends on lags of itself and some vector 
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Note that the structural shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and that the variance 
covariance matrix D is diagonal (shocks are uncorrelated with each other). Provided that the 
coefficient matrix A0 is invertible, equation (1) can be rewritten more compactly as  
 
(2)  ,  
1
0 ()t AL A
− = x ε
 
where  , and L is the lag operator. The Wold moving average (Wold MA) 















5 The same four break dates found for itbr are assumed for the federal funds rate iffr as well. (3)  ,  ( ) tt CL = x ε
 
where  . Note here that A(L) would have to be invertible for equation (3) to 
make sense. The reduced-form Wold moving average representation of x is given by 
11







                                                
(4)   ,  νt ∼ N(0,Σ).  ( ) t EL = x ν
 
Comparing equation (4) with equation (2) above, one can interpret E(L) to be equal to A(L)
-1, 
hence E(0) = I and E(L) is invertible. As a consequence,   is the vector of innovations 
where each element in ν is some linear combination of the structural shocks in x. The (reduced-





(5)  ,  ( ) tt AL = x ν
 
which is the same as equation (2) except that the right hand side of (2),  , is denoted by ν. 




6 The residuals 
from the OLS regression can then be used to calculate Σ. The structural model, i.e., the 
coefficients of   will be identified to the extent that there are enough 
restrictions to determine the elements of C(L) uniquely. In the case of long-run restrictions, by 
making assumptions about the long-run behavior of the variables in the model that will render 
C(1) to be lower triangular, one can invoke the relationship that the spectral density for x at 
frequency zero is proportional to the long-run variance-covariance matrix denoted Λ: 
11
0 () () CL AL A
−− =
 
(6)  , 
'' (1) (1) (1) (1) EE C D C Λ= Σ =
 
 
6 This is equivalent to estimating the model using conditional maximum likelihood under normality or using the 
SUR model with identical regressors in all equations. such that Cholesky decomposing Λ provides a unique lower triangular matrix that is equivalent 
to 
12 (1) CD. Given C(1) and A(1), the impact matrix 
1
0 A
−  can be obtained, and the vector of 
structural shocks ε can then be recovered.  
 
  While long-run identification procedures are popular, there are some issues with their 
implementation. Faust and Leeper (1997) present two major criticisms. The first one is the 
problem of inference regarding the estimated C(1) coefficients. As C(1) estimates are inherently 
imprecise even in large samples, imposing long run restrictions transfers this uncertainty to all 
the structural parameters including coefficients of the impulse-response functions. To address 
this issue, I assume that the true model driving the data is a VAR with a known maximum lag 
order K, where K is determined by standard model selection procedures and is small relative to 
the sample size. In addition, I construct confidence intervals for the impulse-responses and 
variance decompositions with the more reliable bias corrected bootstrap method proposed by 
Kilian (1998). Kilian and Chang (2000) have shown that these confidence intervals (along with 
the Sims and Zha 1999 Bayesian Monte Carlo integration confidence intervals) have superior 
coverage accuracy when compared with the more common ways of constructing confidence 
intervals for impulse-responses, such as Runkle (1987) and Lütkepohl (1990). 
  
Faust and Leeper (1997) were also concerned with the problem posed by multiple shocks. 
Since VAR is usually applied in low dimensional models, the identified shocks must be viewed 
as aggregates of a larger number of underlying shocks. So if one identified structural shock 
consists of two independent shocks, then the Blanchard and Quah long-run identification method 
is valid only if the underlying macroeconomic variables respond to the two shocks in the same 
way. My eight variable benchmark model, rather large for a VAR with long-run restrictions, 
should allow me to address this concern. Due to the size of the VAR, the identified shocks are 
disaggregated into a larger number of sensible categories: the supply and monetary shocks are 
decomposed into those that are common to both countries and those that are particular to only 
one of the countries; the monetary shocks are refined into money supply and money demand 
shocks. A commodity price shock is also introduced to allow for disturbances coming from the 
 
9commodities market to be separated from productivity related supply shocks. Finally, a “taste” 
shock is allowed, which has permanent effects on the real exchange rate but not on output.   
 
3.3  Identification of the VAR Model 
 
  The long-run restrictions imposed on the benchmark model can be expressed in the 
following Wold MA form: 
 
(7)    (1) C = x ε
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The lower triangularity of C(1) can be justified in a straightforward manner. Output is 
supply-driven in the long run,
7 hence shocks unrelated to the supply side of the economy should 
not have long run effects on output. For relative output, a supply shock that is common to both 
countries (ε
s-c) should not lead to long run differences between the two countries. Take a 
technological advancement as an example of a positive common supply shock. There may be 
short-run variations in the rate at which the countries incorporate this new technology into 
production of output, but over time there should be no major gaps in the outputs of the two 
countries that would lead to a shift in the relative output. Hence only a country specific supply 
shock (ε
s) would have long-run impact on relative output. For U.S. output, both common and 
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7 Here I follow the arguments in Blanchard and Quah (1989). Demand factors may indeed have long-run impact on 
output, but the magnitude of the effect would be very small relative to that of supply disturbances. Hence I make the 
assumption that output is only influenced by supply shocks in the long-run.  
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relative supply shocks would have long run effects. This justifies the zeros in the first and second 
rows of C(1).  
 
For the real exchange rate, I only allow the supply shocks and the “taste” shock (ε
d) to 
have permanent effects (hence the zero restrictions on the third row of C(1)). Research on 
exchange rate determination shows that real factors from both the supply and demand sides of 
the economy may lead to long run changes in the real exchange rate, whereas nominal shocks 
such as monetary shocks only have temporary impact. The “taste” shock is meant to capture a 
variety of disturbances that would permanently impact exchange rates but not output. For 
example, it could represent a shift in preferences towards or away from traded goods, changes in 
trade policy that may alter the relative demand for traded goods, etc. The properties of the “taste” 
shock will be analyzed in much more detail later in the paper.  
 
One would expect that commodity prices in the long-run are driven by changes in supply 
and demand of goods and by shocks directly to the commodities market (ε
cp), like an oil price 
shock. However, monetary shocks should have no reason to leave permanent effects on 
commodity prices. This underlies the zero restrictions on the fourth row of C(1).  
 
For the consumer price variables in the VAR, real shocks should play a role in their long-
run value; however, not all nominal shocks would. Money supply shocks (ε
ms and ε
ms-c), defined 
as adjustments in the nominal interest rate in excess of the Federal Reserve’s reaction to 
changing output and inflation, have a long run impact on prices. On the other hand, money 
demand shocks (ε
md and ε
md-c) may not have the same effect. For example, the monetary 
authority, in an effort to keep prices stable, may adjust monetary policy (i.e. interest rates) when 
a money demand shock hits, leaving prices unchanged. This implies that these money demand 
shocks will not have a long run impact on prices. Again, relative shocks would affect the relative 
and non-relative variables, but the common shocks would only affect the non-relative variables; 
hence the zero entries in the fifth and sixth rows of C(1). 
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Finally, note that because interest rates enter the VAR in levels (i.e. it is stationary), none 
of the structural shocks should lead to permanent changes in them. However, as interest rates 
respond quickly to any changes in the economy, all structural shocks are allowed to have short-
term impacts on the interest rate variables. The only exception is that the common money 
demand shock (ε
md-c) is assumed not to have a permanent impact on an accumulation of the 
relative interest rates. This justifies the remaining zero restriction.   
 
4. Estimation  Results  for Structural VAR Model 
 
4.1  Benchmark U.S.-U.K. Case 
 
The reduced-form U.S.-U.K. benchmark VAR is estimated using 4 lags for quarterly 
data.
8 Figure 1 shows the estimated dynamic response of the variable of interest to a one-
standard deviation realization of a particular structural shock. The estimates have been suitably 
transformed to reflect the effect of shocks on the levels of the variables rather than their growth 
rates. I have omitted the results on relative variables in the VAR for brevity. The impulse-
response functions shown in Figure 1 correspond to predictions of macroeconomic theory in 
general, although the point estimates (solid lines in Figure 1) are not always statistically 
significant. For example, consider the exchange rate and monetary policy shock. Looking at the 
fifth row in Figure 1, the relative money supply shock ε
ms, which can best be interpreted as a 
monetary policy shock, is associated with a drop in the 3-month treasury bill rate i tbr. This 
indicates an expansionary monetary policy shock,
9 which should and does lead to an immediate 
depreciation of the real exchange rate, and an increase in output and the price level. Focusing on 
 
8 Standard lag selection criterions select fewer lags [The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) suggest 3, 1, and 1 lags respectively]. 
However, using just one lag suggested by the BIC and HQC leads to non-white-noise like residuals. It is possible 
that in large size VARs such as the one in this paper, the lag selection criteria penalize additional lags to a greater 
degree than for smaller dimension VARs. Because four lags were found to fully capture the serial correlation in the 
data, they are used for the benchmark case and for all other cases considered in this paper. 
 
9 It is possible that an expansionary monetary policy shock may not lead to a drop in interest rates if a liquidity 
effect does not dominate. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) have shown that there is no reason to reject the liquidity 
effect under their VAR framework, and as the sign of the monetary policy shock cannot be identified in any other 
fashion in this context, I will stick to the conventional assumption.  
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the impact of shocks on the real exchange rate, the most striking feature in Figure 1 is the 
impulse-response of real exchange rate q to the taste shock ε
d. The taste shock displays a large 
and statistically significant effect on the real exchange rate both on impact and beyond. This 
shock, however, does not appear to be picking up demand-side factors that are related to output; 
it has essentially zero influence on output both in the short and long-run. Hence I would argue 
that it is appropriate to label the shock as a “taste” shock rather than a “demand” shock. 
  
A related way to examine the impact of individual shocks on the real exchange rate is to 
consider the variance decomposition presented in Table 3, which reports the share of the 
variance of the forecasting error made due to any one structural shock at any given time horizon. 
Looking at the first row of Table 3, one can easily see that the most important shock, explaining 
about 70 percent of the variance in the real exchange rate on impact, is the “taste” shock ε
d. No 
other shock even comes close. The relative monetary policy shock (ε
ms) accounts for a mere 2 
percent. However, if we consider monetary shocks more generally as the combination of money 
supply and demand shocks, then their importance grows, accounting for about 28 percent of the 
variance in the real exchange rate on impact. As the forecast horizon expands, the taste shock 
becomes even more dominant while the monetary shocks’ combined effect declines quickly. 
After four quarters, the total effect of the monetary shocks is less than half of that on impact. As 
for the other shocks in the system, neither the supply shocks nor the commodity price shocks 
have much influence over the real exchange rate at the short or long horizons (the supply shocks 
are allowed to have permanent effect on the real exchange rate, but empirically they do not 
appear to be important).   
 
Despite the differences in modeling assumptions and data, the results here bear many 
similarities to those in Clarida and Gali (1994) and Rogers (1999), both of which used the long-
run identification schemes to investigate the effect of monetary policy shocks on the U.S.-U.K. 
real exchange rate. Demand-type disturbances (including the “taste” shock because it is assumed 
to have no long-run impact on output) are always very important (accounting for over 95 percent 
of real exchange rate variance over any horizon in Clarida and Gali, and over 45 percent in  
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Rogers). Whereas supply disturbances do not play much of a role (proportions of variance that 
can be attributed to supply are lower than 10 percent for both Clarida and Gali and Rogers 
regardless of the time horizon). The main differences in our results arise from monetary shocks. 
Using a simple three variable VAR model, Clarida and Gali found that the maximum impact of 
monetary shock on the real exchange rate is only about 2 percent. In contrast, Rogers’ five-
variable VAR model showed that at a maximum, monetary policy shocks (shocks to the 
monetary base) account for around 15 percent of the variance in the real exchange rate, and this 
number almost triples if one also considers the other monetary shock that he identified (shocks to 
the money multiplier).  
 
Overall though, it is a robust finding under long-run identification schemes that monetary 
policy and supply shocks are not major sources of exchange rate fluctuations. In addition, the 
effects of monetary shocks on real exchange rate that I reported in Figure 1 and Table 3 are well 
within the estimated range found in the literature using non-long-run identification schemes. 
What the results here suggest is that one should focus more on demand side shocks as the main 
source for fluctuations in the real exchange rate. This will be the topic of Section 5 of the paper. 
 
4.2  Results for Other Countries 
 
Three other countries from the G7 (Canada, Germany, and Japan) are considered in this 
paper in additional to the benchmark U.S.-U.K. case. Figure 2 displays impulse-responses of 
U.S. output, real exchange rate, U.S. price level, and U.S. interest rate (3-month treasury bill rate 
for Canada and the federal funds rate for Germany and Japan) to a one standard deviation 
monetary policy shock. These impulse-responses are produced from VAR models with the same 
specification as the benchmark case using four lags. From the analysis in the previous section, 
we know that the long-run restrictions imposed on the U.S.-U.K. VAR model appear to have 
identified an expansionary monetary policy shock that lowers the treasury bill rate itbr on impact, 
produces a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and leads to a rise in output and prices over 
time. For the other country pairs, the monetary policy shock does not appear to be as sharply  
15
                                                
identified. From Figure 2 one can observe some counter-intuitive responses of the price level and 
exchange rate to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock.  
 
The presence of these “puzzles” is not uncommon and has been discussed at length in the 
literature. Putting the puzzles aside, we can still assess the relative strengths of each structural 
shock on the real exchange rate for these countries pairs using variance decomposition, and the 
results presented in Table 4 through 6 make it clear that the taste shock is still by far the most 
important shock that contribute to exchange rate variability, perhaps with the exception of Japan 
in the short-run. The variance decomposition results for Japan in Table 6 show that monetary 
policy shocks have the strongest effect on impact relative to all the other country pairs, 
accounting for almost 16 percent of the variance in the real exchange rate on impact, though the 
most important shock for this particular time horizon is the relative money demand shock, 
accounting for over 47 percent of the variance in the real exchange rate. Together all the 
monetary shocks explain the majority of exchange rate variability (about 75 percent) 
immediately after the shocks hit the economy. These monetary shocks are very persistent as well, 
even at the 40-quarter horizon, all the monetary shocks combined account for about 10 percent of 
total variance in the dollar-yen exchange rate.
10 Due to the overwhelming importance of the 
monetary shocks, the taste shock in the U.S.-Japan case is relatively small on impact, only 
accounting for about 16 percent of the variance in the exchange rate. But as the effect of 
monetary shocks die off, the taste shock gains in importance, though in the very long-run the 
taste shock still accounts for about thirty percentage points less than in the benchmark case.  
 
These non-benchmark country pair results are roughly consistent with what was found in 
a number of other papers in the literature using a variety of different identification schemes, such 
as Clarida and Gali (1994), Grilli and Roubini (1995), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), and Faust 
 
10 The strong monetary policy shock results for Japan and to some extent Germany are not due to the fact that the 
federal funds rate was used as the U.S. interest rate variable i in the VAR models (instead of the 3-month treasury 
bill rate). Robustness checks show that if I replace the federal funds rate with the 3-month treasury bill rate in the 
German and Japanese VARs, the monetary policy shock comes out slightly weaker and the taste shock slightly 
stronger. If I replace the 3-month treasury bill rate with the federal funds rate in the VARs for the U.K. and Canada 
instead, there is practically no difference in the results, in fact, the taste shock actually comes out slightly stronger 
than what is reported in the tables.  
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and Rogers (2003). It is rather curious that most of these papers find much stronger monetary 
policy shock effects on the dollar-yen and dollar-mark exchange rates compared to the dollar-
pound or dollar-Canadian dollar exchange rates, but none elaborated on the possible reasons 
why. A potential explanation could be that the financial systems in Germany and Japan are much 
more bank-based than Canada or the U.K., which may exacerbate the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on real and financial macro variables.  
 
5.  A Further Investigation of the “Taste” Shock 
 
  From the results reported in the previous section, it is clear that the “taste” shock plays 
the main role in exchange rate fluctuations, both at short and long horizons. However, it is less 
clear what this taste shock represents. Because the taste shock is identified as a shock that has 
permanent effects on all the variables in the VAR except output, and there are no other non-
monetary demand-type shocks identified in the system, it is very likely that the taste shock 
captures a variety of demand side disturbances unrelated to money.  
 
In the exchange rate determination literature, besides the usual discussions of supply side 
factors (productivity and price differentials working through the Balassa-Samuelson effect to 
influence exchange rate), a variety of demand side factors have also been suggested. Froot and 
Rogoff (1991), Rogoff (1992), and DeGregorio and Wolf (1994), among many others, have 
emphasized the importance of government spending shocks in the absence of perfect capital 
mobility, which are shown to be empirically important in Froot and Rogoff (1991) and Rogers 
(1999). Also, since exchange rate is an essential element in international trade, factors related to 
trade may be crucial to exchange rate determination as well, such as terms of trade (Gregorio and 
Wolf 1994 and Stockman 1980), trade openness and changes in trade policy (see Li 2003 for an 
excellent summary of theoretical and empirical studies in the area), and the current account 
(Krugman 1990). Economists have also been interested in the impact of more abstract factors 
like risk and expectations on exchange rates. Dornbusch (1976) provides a classic model of 
expectation and exchange rate dynamics. Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2006) construct a general  
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equilibrium monetary model with endogenous risk variations that is able to reproduce some key 
features of actual exchange rates. More recent empirical research on exchange rate determination 
has focused on the microstructures of the foreign exchange or financial market. These studies 
have suggested that shocks related to information dispersions or foreign exchange order flow 
(Evans and Lyons 2002) can have a significant impact on the exchange rate. However, as these 
studies often make use of very high frequency data, the findings that shocks to information 
dispersion and order flow affect the exchange rate may not be as relevant for longer horizon 
variations considered here. The taste shock identified in the structural VAR model could be a 
combination of some or all of the factors mentioned above, so I will now extend my analysis in 
the previous section to determine the main factor or factors behind the taste shock and hence find 
the driving force of real exchange rate variability. 
 
Standard theory predicts that a positive demand shock to the U.S. economy leads to a 
short-run increase in output, a long-run increase in U.S. prices, and a short-run appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar in real terms. Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse-response functions of the taste 
shock on the relevant output, price and exchange rate variables for the four countries under 
investigation. Let us focus our attention on the benchmark U.S.-U.K. results first. Figure 3 shows 
that U.S. output y does not seem to be affected much by the taste shock, with the impulse-
response function hovering around zero. Relative output exhibits more of a response, showing 
that the shock could be related to a relative demand shock favoring U.K. output and producing a 
real depreciation of the U.S. dollar as exhibited by the impulse-response of the real exchange rate 
q. Meanwhile, the price variables show little response to the taste shock. One could imagine that 
if the taste shock captures traditional demand-like shocks such as government spending shocks 
or shocks to income and consumption, the reaction of output and prices would be much larger 
than what is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Looking at the results for the other country pairs in Figure 4, the story is similar to the 
benchmark case. There are very small responses of output and prices to the taste shock, with the 
95 percent confidence interval always including zero. Japan is the only exception to the rule. It is  
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rather peculiar that the relative price variable for the U.S.-Japan pair exhibits such strong and 
significant reaction to the taste shock despite little movement on the relative output front. This is 
further evidence that the taste shock is not a typical demand shock (price response with no output 
effect), and it appears to have differing effects on different country pairs as well. 
 
As mentioned earlier, factors related to risk and expectations could be a driving force 
behind exchange rates, and shifts in these elements are likely to show up in interest rate 
variables, especially relative interest rates. Figure 5 illustrates the impulse-responses of the 
interest rate variables to a one standard deviation taste shock for the four country pairs. Wide 
confidence intervals covering the zero line are the dominating trait for all the country pairs. This 
indicates that reactions of the interest rate variables to the taste shock are statistically 
insignificant. Movements in relative short-term interest rates are slightly larger than for the U.S. 
short-term rate. The reactions are also slightly larger for the German and Japanese cases.
11  
 
The only other demand side factors that have not been considered yet are those related to 
international trade and those that have their roots in the micro structures of the foreign exchange 
market. Microeconomic factors such as “order flow” have been shown to be important in 
exchange rate determination (see, for example, Evans and Lyons 2002), hence could be a 
significant source for the taste shock. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate 
market microstructure that operates at high frequencies and requires high frequency data for 
analysis, therefore, I will concentrate on the potential effects of international trade factors on real 
exchange rate. Using regression analysis, I examine the relationship between the taste shocks and 
three variables that have been emphasized by previous theoretical and empirical studies: trade 
openness, terms of trade, and the current account.  
  
Following related literature in the area of international trade, I consider the ratio of 
exports plus imports to the gross domestic product, sometimes referred to as “trade intensity,” as 
 
11 As in the monetary policy shock case, robustness checks show that the larger impact of the taste shock on the 
interest rate variables for Germany and Japan is not due to the fact that I use the federal funds rate instead of the 
three-month treasury bill rate in the VAR model estimations for these two countries. Indeed, the reactions of the 
interest rate variables are even larger if I replace the federal funds rate with the treasury bill rate here.  
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the proxy for trade openness. Trade intensity is one of the most commonly used measures of 
openness in the literature, where the data needed for the construction of the variable are reliable 
and readily available for the countries and sample period being considered. Theoretical models 
point to a real depreciation of the domestic currency after an increase in trade openness. As a 
country liberalizes its trade, demand for imports increases and demand for non-tradables 
decreases in response to relative price change. Then, if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, a 
real depreciation would be necessary to maintain internal and external balance. However, Calvo 
and Drazen (1998) have argued that if the trade liberalization is non-credible (or of uncertain 
duration) then it is potentially possible to see real appreciation instead. There is little empirical 
evidence on this subject, though Li (2003) shows that using event studies, ceteris paribus, the 
real exchange rate depreciates after a country’s most recent episode of trade liberalization.  
 
The “terms of trade” variable is measured as the ratio of export prices to import prices. 
Intuitively, this is a ratio that quantifies a country’s welfare. An increase (or improvement) in the 
terms of trade implies the home country gets more units of imported good for each unit of good it 
exports. This variable could affect the real exchange rate through both income and substitution 
effects. An increase in the terms of trade, for example, would mean a boost to real income and, 
therefore, a rise in demand and hence the relative price for non-tradables. The general price level 
would increase as a result, so this income effect eventually leads to appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The substitution effect is less straightforward. Assuming that non-tradables and 
tradables are substitutes, an improvement of the terms of trade would cause the non-tradable 
prices to increase relative to imports, but decrease relative to exports, leaving ambiguous the 
change in the relative price of non-tradables to tradables as a whole. Hence, if income effect 
dominates, an improvement in, say, the U.S. terms of trade relative to a foreign country would 
mean a real appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the foreign country’s currency. De 
Gregorio and Wolf (1994) find that for their sample of OECD countries, an improvement in the 
terms of trade does lead to a real appreciation.     
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The final trade variable under consideration here is the current account, which enters the 
analysis as a ratio (current account to GDP). Theoretically speaking, it is rather natural to see a 
link between real exchange rates and current account, as both exports and imports are affected 
when the real exchange rate changes. However, the direction of causation may go the other way 
also. It is well documented that sustained current account deficits are associated with long-run 
real exchange rate depreciation. Wright and Gagnon (2006) presented results that show the 
current account to GDP ratio has a modest but statistically significant effect on the estimated 
probability of a large depreciation; and Krugman (1990) argues that current account changes lead 
to transfers of wealth across countries, and as the spending pattern differs across home and 
foreign residents, it is likely to induce significant real exchange rate changes.  
 
  Table 7 presents the regression results. The counterfactual real exchange rate with only 
the taste shock on is the dependent variable.
12 The explanatory variables include the three trade 
measures mentioned previously, each entering the regression as a country specific trade variable. 
Since the dependent variable is non-stationary by construction, and most of the trade variables 
are also non-stationary according to standard unit root tests,
13 a percentage change specification 
is necessary to avoid the spurious regression problem.
14  
 
In general, results presented in Table 7 show that for all country pairs, at least one of the 
trade measures show up as a statistically significant explanatory variable for the hypothetical real 
exchange rate with only the taste shock on, hence could be potential sources of the taste shock. 
Specifically, for the benchmark U.S.-U.K. case, U.S. and U.K. terms of trade as well as U.K. 
trade openness appear to be significant. The coefficients on these variables have the expected 
 
12 The hypothetical series reflects the effect of the accumulation of taste shocks on the real exchange rate. 
 
13 Unit root test results available upon request. 
 
14 Another solution to the spurious regression problem is to check for potential cointegrating relationships between 
the dependent and explanatory variables, and if there is cointegration, one can apply the dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) specification with Newey-West standard error correction. However, it was not possible for me to 
reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level using the Zt-test developed by Phillips (1987) for any of the 
country pairs under investigation here. The critical values used for the Zt-test are produced from the FORTRAN 
programs provided by MacKinnon (1996). 
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signs except for U.S. terms of trade. A positive coefficient for the U.S. terms of trade indicates 
that as the U.S. terms of trade improves, we observe a depreciation of the U.S. real exchange 
rate. This is somewhat counter intuitive, though if the substitution effect dominates in the U.S. 
economy, we could potentially see a real depreciation despite the improvement in terms of trade. 
For Canada, the Canadian trade openness and terms of trade measures both show up as 
significant explanatory variables for the hypothetical exchange rate. Both of these variables have 
the expected signs. For Germany, only one trade variable comes up significant, the German 
terms of trade. The coefficient is highly significant though and has the expected sign. Finally, for 
Japan, U.S. trade openness appears to be highly significant while the Japanese terms of trade is 
significant at the 10% level. Again, both of these variables have the expected signs.   
 
On the whole, the regression analysis appears to have pinned down a potential source of 
the taste shock, namely the international trade sector of the economy.
15 Foreign terms of trade 
measures seem particularly important, showing up as a significant explanatory variable in all 
country pairs. Current account, on the other hand, does not seem to matter. One can interpret the 
results here as being fairly consistent with the earlier findings as shocks in trading terms and 
conditions are frequent, but may not have immediate or prominent effects on output or interest 




  The results in this paper provide evidence against the prevalent idea that nominal factors 
such as monetary policy shocks have been the dominant source of real exchange rate fluctuations 
during the post Bretton Woods era. This is not to say that nominal shocks are unimportant. In 
 
15 As a robustness check, I included the percentage change in government expenditure (relative to GDP) as an 
explanatory variable in some specifications of the regression analysis. If the taste shock is capturing fiscal type 
shocks to the economy, this variable should be statistically significant in the regressions. For all country pairs, 
neither the U.S. nor the foreign government expenditure measures show up as statistically significant even at the 
10% level. The only exception to the rule is for the U.S.-German case, where the U.S. government expenditure 
variable is a significant explanatory variable for the hypothetical real exchange rate at the 5% level. Because of the 
general result that government expenditure does not affect the taste shock, Table 7 reports the specification with 
only the trade variables.     
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many cases they are, especially for the dollar-yen exchange rate. However, the dominant factor 
dictating exchange rate movements in my results appear to be non-monetary in nature. For the 
benchmark U.S.-U.K. case, at a maximum, total monetary shocks (money supply plus money 
demand shocks) account for less than thirty percent of the forecasted error variance in the dollar-
pound real exchange rate. The number is even smaller for the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Germany 
cases. Japan is the only exception where total monetary shocks account for over seventy-five 
percent of forecasted error variance in the real exchange rate at the peak horizon (on impact). In 
contrast, a real factor, which I termed a “taste” shock, appears to be the main source of real 
exchange rate variability over the short, medium, and long horizons. This taste shock accounts 
for over fifty percent of real exchange rate forecast error variance over all horizons for every 
country in the sample except for Japan. Even in the Japanese case, nominal shocks are the most 
important only in the first four quarters, after which the taste shock takes over as the 
predominant factor. 
 
My results complement those in Clarida and Gali (1994), who also found real shocks to 
be important for exchange rate fluctuations. However, the model in this paper offers a refinement 
over theirs in the sense that it contains a richer information set and hence can distinguish 
between a larger number of possible shocks that may drive the exchange rate. The results 
presented are also along the lines of empirical papers that make use of other identification 
strategies, such as Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), who have shown that monetary policy shocks 
are not the main driving force behind exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
  These findings imply that policy makers and economists alike will be misguided if all 
they worry about is the effects of monetary shocks on exchange rates. Instead, more emphasis 
should be placed on real shocks such as shocks to the trading sector of the economy. I have 
shown that the taste shock, which plays the essential role in dictating the movements in the 
exchange rate, appears to be associated with important trade measures such as trade openness, 
terms of trade, and the current account. Perhaps surprisingly, the taste shock does not seem to be 
related to macroeconomic shocks such as shocks to government spending.   
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The model here could be further extended in subsequent research to consider a wider 
range of short-run and long-run restrictions (including combinations of both) that would allow 
other potentially important shocks to be identified individually (for example government 
spending shocks). Also, it would be interesting to see if the results are robust to using the 
sign/shape restriction method for identification, which typically has shown monetary shocks to 
be quite important for exchange rates. Finally, a larger set of real exchange rates could be 
considered to see if the trade factors found important here for the bilateral exchange rates 
between the U.S. and the four industrialized countries will hold up for bilateral exchange rates 
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 TABLE  1   
 
DATA DETAILS AND SOURCES 
 
Variable Detail  Source 
 




Relative output = ln(U.S. real GDP)
1 – ln(foreign real GDP)
2 
 










U.S. output = U.S. real GDP  FRED 
q 
 
Real exchange rate = ln(nominal exchange rate)
5 + ln(foreign 
CPI)
6 – ln(U.S. CPI)
7 
  
U.S. data from FRED 
 
Exchange rate and 





Real Intermediate materials price = ln(producer price index: 
intermediate materials)
8 – ln(U.S. CPI) 
 
FRED 
p - p* 
 
 
Relative prices = ln(U.S. CPI) – ln(foreign CPI)  U.S. data from FRED 
 





U.S. CPI = U.S. consumer price index  FRED 
i - i* 
 
Relative short-term interest rate  
= U.S. 3-month treasury bill rate( or federal funds rate) – foreign 
short-term treasury bill rate (or money market rate)
9 
 
U.S. data from FRED 
 









U.S. Federal Funds Rate
11 FRED 
 
1. Real gross domestic product (GDPC96), seasonally adjusted annual rate in billions of chained 2000 dollars.  
2. Canada: GDP volume 1997 ref. chained (15699B.RXF...), Germany: GDP volume 2000 = 100 (13499BVRZF...),  
    Japan: GDP volume 2000 = 100 (15899BVRZF...), U.K.: GDP volume 2003 ref. chained (11299B.RXF...). Chained  
    volume is chosen whenever it is available for the sample period under consideration.  
3. St. Louis Fed FRED database. 
4. International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.  
5. Nominal exchange rate defined as amount of U.S. dollars needed to purchase one unit of foreign currency. For  
    nominal exchange rate between U.S. and Germany, it is the amount of U.S. dollars needed to purchase one German  
    Mark. Since the DM is defunct after Dec. 1998, I patched on the Euro movement to the data after that date. 
6. Canada: CPI all cities pop over 30,000 (15664...ZF...), Germany: GDP deflator 2000 = 100 (13499BIRZF...), Japan:  
    CPI all Japan 485 items (15864...ZF...), U.K.: CPI all items (11264...ZF...). Had to use GDP deflator for Germany as  
    CPI data is incomplete over sample period. 
7. CPI For All Urban Consumers: All Items (SA) 1982-84 = 100 (CPIAUCSL). 
8. Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials: Supplies & Components (PPIITM), seasonally adjusted 1982 = 100. 
9. Treasury bill rates are used for Canada and the U.K.; Germany and Japan use the money market rates. Decisions on  
    which rate to use are based on availability of data during sample period.  
10. 3-month treasury bill rate (TB3MS). 
11. Effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS). 
 
Note:  Data that are originally in monthly form (everything except for GDP) are converted to quarterly by taking the 
quarter’s last monthly observation. TABLE  2   
 





Variable Structural  breaks 
    
U.S.  Δp  
 
1981Q2 




  itbr  1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1985Q2 
 
  iffr  1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1985Q2 
 
Canada  Δ(p – p*)  1981Q2, 1990Q4 
 
  i – i* 
 
1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1983Q4, 1985Q2, 1992Q2 
Germany  Δ(p – p*) 
 
1972Q4, 1980Q3, 1990Q4 
  i – i* 
 
1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1984Q2, 1985Q2, 1992Q3 
 
Japan  Δ(p – p*) 
 
1977Q2, 1981Q2, 1997Q1 
  i – i* 
 
1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1985Q2 
 
U.K.  Δ(p – p*) 
 
1974Q1, 1975Q1, 1981Q2, 1990Q1  
  i – i* 
 
1979Q2, 1981Q2, 1982Q2, 1983Q4, 1985Q2, 1992Q3 
    
 
Note:  All calculations performed using Gauss. The Gauss program assumes that the series being tested has a simple 
AR(1) structure and has one break in the mean. It then calculates the F-statistic for all potential break dates over the 
sample period with trimming factor = 0.15. The date with the largest F-stat is then tested for significance using the 
critical values produced by Andrews (1993, 2003). If it is a valid break date, then the original sample is split into two 
on the break date, and the same procedure is repeated for the first sub-sample and second sub-sample to search for 
more break dates. This process continues until the sub-samples are too small to be used or when no more valid break 
dates are found. I start the structural break search with U.S. inflation (Δp), then apply the same break date found in Δp 
on relative inflation Δ(p – p*) and the U.S. 3-month treasury bill rate (itbr). The search procedure is repeated to find 
additional breaks in Δ(p – p*) and itbr. Structural breaks in iffr are simply assumed to be the same as the structural 
breaks found in itbr. The reason for this assumption is that the breaks found for iffr through the search procedure did not 
make the modified iffr series (with structural breaks imposed) stationary, whereas when we imposed the same breaks 
found in itbr on iffr, the modified series becomes stationary. This may seem a bit ad-hoc, but intuitively one would think 
that structural breaks on two closely related interest rates could and should be identical. Finally, I impose the break 
dates found in itbr on the relative short-term interest rates (i – i*) then search for more breaks.     TABLE  3 
   
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS FOR U.S.-U.K. BILATERAL 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN LEVELS 
 





































(1)   0 quarter  0.84    0.68  69.57  0.34  2.18  0.02  15.06  10.8  28.06 
        Lower band  (0.01) (0.01)  (15.38) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05)   
        Upper band  (28.13)  (32.12)  (80.97)  (29.71)  (25.56)  (16.65)  (34.80)  (34.74)   
 











        Lower band  (0.31) (0.38)  (27.27) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.36) (0.25)   
        Upper band  (41.65)  (26.39)  (87.21)  (27.06)  (13.93)  (13.16)  (9.94)  (17.67)   
 











        Lower band  (0.38) (0.41)  (31.32) (0.25) (0.22) (0.16) (0.29) (0.23)   
        Upper band  (44.14)  (30.44)  (90.02)  (22.01)  (11.58)  (8.90)  (5.94)  (11.02)   
 











        Lower band  (0.38) (0.42)  (32.31) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.22) (0.18)   
        Upper band  (47.08)  (34.06)  (91.57)  (17.66)  (8.86)  (5.80)  (4.46)  (7.20)   
 











        Lower band  (0.32) (0.37)  (32.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16)   
        Upper band  (49.44)  (37.54)  (92.42)  (14.61)  (6.45)  (4.30)  (3.27)  (4.93)   
 











        Lower band  (0.34) (0.33)  (32.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)   
        Upper band  (50.21)  (39.67)  (93.42)  (12.03)  (5.01)  (3.32)  (2.52)  (3.65)   
 











        Lower band  (0.29) (0.23)  (29.59) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)   
        Upper band  (54.32)  (44.70)  (95.71)  (5.83)  (2.23)  (1.52)  (1.15)  (1.50)   
            
 
Note: Benchmark specification period is from 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 with 4 lags. Confidence intervals are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-
corrected bootstrap methods. The lower band indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution. Similarly, the upper band indicates the 
97.5
th percentile. The estimated variance decomposition numbers in this table sometimes fall outside the confidence interval bands. This can be 
explained using a simple example. Suppose the true proportion of the forecast error variance of the real exchange rate explained by a particular 
structural shock is zero. Then confidence bands generated from random drawings will most likely not include zero (since it is bounded below by 
zero). Hence if the estimated proportion is really close to 0% or 100%, then it is likely to fall outside the 95% confidence interval constructed. The 
last column (total monetary shocks) is constructed by simply summing together the proportion of variances due to ε
ms , ε
ms-c, ε
md , and ε
md-c.                              
 TABLE  4 
   
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS FOR U.S.-CANADA BILATERAL 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN LEVELS 
 





































(1)      0  quarter  1.73      0.83  87.48 0.09 3.73 2.65 0.46 3.03  9.87 
        Lower band  (0.01) (0.01)  (17.81) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)   
        Upper band  (29.27)  (31.16)  (87.75)  (21.68)  (34.01)  (31.28)  (26.42)  (26.43)   
 











        Lower band  (0.19) (0.22)  (24.42) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22)   
        Upper band  (29.79)  (37.42)  (88.39)  (17.78)  (21.72)  (16.35)  (20.19)  (20.01)   
 











        Lower band  (0.22) (0.26)  (28.30) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)   
        Upper band  (36.06)  (42.98)  (90.66)  (14.83)  (14.87)  (12.47)  (14.62)  (11.33)   
 











        Lower band  (0.25) (0.28)  (29.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)   
        Upper band  (41.00)  (47.25)  (92.21)  (11.22)  (10.82)  (9.39)  (10.40)  (7.25)   
 











        Lower band  (0.25) (0.30)  (29.72) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)   
        Upper band  (43.92)  (50.24)  (93.25)  (9.21)  (8.27)  (7.19)  (7.50)  (5.12)   
 











        Lower band  (0.23) (0.33)  (30.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)   
        Upper band  (45.60)  (52.77)  (93.76)  (7.33)  (6.82)  (5.75)  (5.78)  (3.95)   
 











        Lower band  (0.19) (0.34)  (29.36) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)   
        Upper band  (50.82)  (55.63)  (95.68)  (3.37)  (3.17)  (2.58)  (2.54)  (1.75)   
            
 
Note: Sample period for Canada is from 1970Q2 to 2006Q2 with 4 lags. Confidence intervals are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected 
bootstrap methods. The lower band indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution. Similarly, the upper band indicates the 97.5
th 
percentile. The estimated variance decomposition numbers in this table sometimes fall outside the confidence interval bands. This can be explained 
using a simple example. Suppose the true proportion of the forecast error variance of the real exchange rate explained by a particular structural 
shock is zero. Then confidence bands generated from random drawings will most likely not include zero (since it is bounded below by zero). 
Hence if the estimated proportion is really close to 0% or 100%, then it is likely to fall outside the 95% confidence interval constructed. The last 




md-c.                                      
 TABLE  5 
   
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS FOR U.S.-GERMANY BILATERAL 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN LEVELS 
 





































(1)   0 quarter  0.40    0.81  76.34  8.75  10.43  2.37  0.18  0.72  13.70 
        Lower band  (0.01) (0.19) (1.03) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)   
        Upper band  (36.93)  (59.97)  (69.75)  (25.72)  (58.57)  (37.09)  (18.92)  (11.67)   
 











        Lower band  (0.54) (0.97) (6.93) (0.36) (1.06) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15)   
        Upper band  (40.21)  (58.64)  (77.18)  (25.38)  (32.29)  (24.08)  (10.33)  (6.00)   
 











        Lower band  (0.63) (1.17)  (17.40) (0.31) (0.67) (0.21) (0.15) (0.13)   
        Upper band  (40.30)  (51.35)  (83.53)  (20.29)  (24.30)  (17.60)  (7.39)  (4.37)   
 











        Lower band  (0.56) (1.05)  (23.82) (0.24) (0.46) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09)   
        Upper band  (41.52)  (46.19)  (86.69)  (15.93)  (18.39)  (14.54)  (5.61)  (3.09)   
 











        Lower band  (0.57) (0.92)  (27.10) (0.20) (0.35) (0.17) (0.08) (0.07)   
        Upper band  (42.94)  (45.11)  (89.01)  (12.63)  (13.76)  (11.98)  (4.27)  (2.23)   
 











        Lower band  (0.59) (0.88)  (30.37) (0.18) (0.29) (0.15) (0.06) (0.96)   
        Upper band  (43.89)  (44.51)  (89.99)  (10.39)  (10.93)  (9.84)  (3.44)  (1.81)   
 











        Lower band  (0.63) (0.71)  (32.46) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)   
        Upper band  (48.67)  (47.11)  (93.57)  (5.43)  (5.42)  (5.25)  (1.68)  (0.85)   
            
 
Note: Sample period for Germany is from 1970Q2 to 2005Q4 with 4 lags. Confidence intervals are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected 
bootstrap methods. The lower band indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution. Similarly, the upper band indicates the 97.5
th 
percentile. The estimated variance decomposition numbers in this table sometimes fall outside the confidence interval bands. This can be explained 
using a simple example. Suppose the true proportion of the forecast error variance of the real exchange rate explained by a particular structural 
shock is zero. Then confidence bands generated from random drawings will most likely not include zero (since it is bounded below by zero). 
Hence if the estimated proportion is really close to 0% or 100%, then it is likely to fall outside the 95% confidence interval constructed. The last 




md-c.                                      
 TABLE  6 
   
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS FOR U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN LEVELS 
 





































(1)      0  quarter  1.71     0.47 15.55  6.90 15.63 12.33 47.40  0.01  75.37 
        Lower band  (0.19) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.19) (4.33) (0.00)   
        Upper band  (63.96)  (43.28)  (29.80)  (40.99)  (19.31)  (38.36)  (52.98)  (9.03)   
 











        Lower band  (1.16) (0.56) (8.28) (0.34) (0.24) (0.36) (1.17) (0.12)   
        Upper band  (56.63)  (46.55)  (71.68)  (31.14)  (22.46)  (17.05)  (20.13)  (5.26)   
 











        Lower band  (1.01) (0.56)  (11.50) (0.34) (0.22) (0.36) (0.64) (0.13)   
        Upper band  (58.75)  (51.82)  (79.06)  (24.34)  (19.66)  (8.83)  (12.25)  (4.56)   
 











        Lower band  (0.91) (0.52)  (13.85) (0.38) (0.19) (0.31) (0.40) (0.10)   
        Upper band  (61.22)  (55.13)  (82.37)  (19.17)  (17.79)  (6.10)  (7.79)  (3.43)   
 











        Lower band  (0.81) (0.46)  (14.85) (0.38) (0.14) (0.25) (0.26) (0.08)   
        Upper band  (63.88)  (56.84)  (84.84)  (17.03)  (15.37)  (5.10)  (5.13)  (2.42)   
 











        Lower band  (1.04) (0.40)  (14.50) (0.30) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) (0.06)   
        Upper band  (68.40)  (58.93)  (86.22)  (14.56)  (12.03)  (4.23)  (3.80)  (1.82)   
 











        Lower band  (1.16) (0.41) (9.80) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03)   
        Upper band  (80.77)  (61.98)  (88.11)  (7.03)  (4.96)  (1.66)  (1.44)  (0.63)   
            
 
Note: Sample period for Japan is from 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 with 4 lags. Confidence intervals are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected 
bootstrap methods. The lower band indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution. Similarly, the upper band indicates the 97.5
th 
percentile. The estimated variance decomposition numbers in this table sometimes fall outside the confidence interval bands. This can be explained 
using a simple example. Suppose the true proportion of the forecast error variance of the real exchange rate explained by a particular structural 
shock is zero. Then confidence bands generated from random drawings will most likely not include zero (since it is bounded below by zero). 
Hence if the estimated proportion is really close to 0% or 100%, then it is likely to fall outside the 95% confidence interval constructed. The last 




md-c.                                      
 TABLE  7 
   
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR HYPOTHETICAL REAL EXCHANGE RATE WITH ONLY TASTE SHOCK ON 
 
Country C 
%Δ of trade 
openness 
(U.S.) 
%Δ of terms 
of trade 
(U.S.) 
%Δ of current 
account 
(U.S.) 
%Δ of trade 
openness 
(foreign) 
%Δ of terms 
of trade 
(foreign) 














 (0.0885)  (0.1150)  (0.0845)  (0.0990) (0.1037)  (0.0994)  (0.0882) 
             
Canada 0.0124  -0.0258 0.0696 -0.0389  -0.2291
** 0.1991
** 0.0454 
 (0.0893)  (0.1135)  (0.0948)  (0.0921) (0.0910)  (0.0871)  (0.0839) 
             
Germany 0.0573  0.1076
  -0.0186 -0.1001  -0.0750  0.3639
*** 0.0174 
 (0.0824)  (0.1045)  (0.0904)  (0.0845) (0.0856)  (0.0878)  (0.0895) 
             
Japan 0.1251  0.4202
*** 0.0283 -0.1960  -0.1984  0.2260
* 0.1100 
 (0.0859)  (0.1255)  (0.1203)  (0.3007) (0.1289)  (0.1272)  (0.0863) 
             
 
* significant at the 10% level using 2-tailed t-test 
** significant at the 5% level using 2-tailed t-test 
*** significant at the 1% level using 2-tailed t-test 
 
Note: Table above presents a percentage change specification. This specification is implemented instead of natural log difference to  
accommodate the fact that current account data is mostly negative. Estimated coefficients are reported (with standard errors in brackets).  
All variables are standardized by their own standard deviation prior to estimation. This facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients as  
each coefficient would represent the effect of a one standard deviation change of the trade variable on the standardized real exchange rate.   FIGURE  1 
  
IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION  
STRUCTURAL SHOCK FOR BENCHMARK U.S.-U.K. MODEL 
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Note: Benchmark specification period is from 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 with 4 lags. Impulse responses for up to 30 quarters are displayed. Confidence intervals 
(dashed lines) are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap methods. The lower dashed line indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped 
distribution and the upper dashed line indicates the 97.5
th percentile. FIGURE  2 
 
IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION U.S. MONETARY POLICY 
SHOCK FOR U.S.-CANADA, U.S.-GERMANY, AND U.S.-JAPAN MODELS 
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Note: Sample periods are 1970Q2 to 2006Q2 (Canada), 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 (Japan), and 1970Q2 to 2005Q4 
(Germany) with 4 lags. Impulse responses for up to 30 quarters are displayed. Confidence intervals (dashed lines) 
are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap methods. The lower dashed line indicates the 2.5
th 
percentile of the bootstrapped distribution and the upper dashed line indicates the 97.5
th percentile.  
 FIGURE  3 
 
IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION TASTE SHOCK FOR  





















































Note: Sample period 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 with 4 lags. Impulse responses for up to 30 quarters are displayed. Confidence 
intervals (dashed lines) are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap methods. The lower dashed line 
indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution and the upper dashed line indicates the 97.5
th percentile.  FIGURE  4 
 
IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION TASTE SHOCK FOR  
U.S.-CANADA, U.S.-GERMANY, AND U.S.-JAPAN MODELS 
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Note: Sample periods are 1970Q2 to 2006Q2 (Canada), 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 (Japan), and 1970Q2 to 2005Q4 
(Germany) with 4 lags. Impulse responses for up to 30 quarters are displayed. Confidence intervals (dashed lines) 
are obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap methods. The lower dashed line indicates the 2.5
th 
percentile of the bootstrapped distribution and the upper dashed line indicates the 97.5
th percentile.  FIGURE  5 
 
IMPULSE RESPONSES OF INTEREST RATE VARIABLES TO A ONE STANDARD 
DEVIATION TASTE SHOCK  
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Note: Sample periods are 1970Q2 to 2006Q2 (Canada), 1970Q2 to 2006Q1 (U.K. and Japan), and 1970Q2 to 2005Q4 
(Germany) with 4 lags. Impulse responses for up to 30 quarters are displayed. Confidence intervals (dashed lines) are 
obtained using the Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap methods. The lower dashed line indicates the 2.5
th percentile of the 
bootstrapped distribution and the upper dashed line indicates the 97.5
th percentile.  